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By Letter of 18 Septelllber 1984,.. the C.oai ttee on Energy, Research 
and Technology requested· authorization to draw up a report on the transfer 
of technology. 
By letter of 14 January 1985,. the committee was authorized to report 
on this subject. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy and the COIIlllittee on Eltternal Econam;c Relations were 
asked for opinions. 
On 22 November 19&4, the Co~ittee on Energy, Research and Technology 
appointed Mr A. METTEN rappornur, as well as draftsman of the opinion to 
the Committee on External E-eonoeic Affairs .on t.be restrictions proposed by 
the USA on the international transfer O·f technology and the adverse effects 
of these restrictions on industriat development in the European Community 
~Doc. 2-721/84), for which th·is report is considered also the opinion of 
the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology. 
At its meetings of 22 January.., 22 April and 15 May 1985, the Committee 
on Energy, Research and Technology considered the draft report. It 
adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole on 16 September 1985 
unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr PONIATOWSKI, Chairman; 
Messrs SALZER, ADAM, and SELIGMAN, Vice-Chairmen; Mr METTEN, rapporteur; 
iVlessrs ·BONACCINI (deput i 7 ing for l"lr VALENLI>, CROUX <deputizing for 
Mr ~STGEN), FORD Cdeoutizinq for Mrs LIZIN>, KILBY, KOLOKOTRONIS, 
LINKOHR, MALLET, MUNCH, RINSCHE, SP~TH, STAES, TURNER, Mrs VIEHOFF. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on 
External Economic Relations have decided not to deliver an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 24 September 1985. 
1
"he deadline for tabl.ing amendments to this report wilL be indicated 
in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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The Committee on Energy, Rese~rch and Technology hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
A • 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on technology transfer 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr LINKOHR on the restrictions 
imposed by the USA on the international transfer of technology and the adverse 
effects of these restrictions on industrial developmPnt in the European Com-
munity (Doc.2-721/84), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Energy, Research ana Technology 
on the transfer of technology <Doc.A 2-99/oS>, 
A. whereas scientific ana industrial progress is based on the free exchange of 
ideas, know-how and information, 
B. whereas there is considerable interlocking between science and industry in 
Western Europe and the USA as witnessed, among other things, by the large 
number of post-doctoral stuaents and leading scientists of European origin 
in the USA and the fact that output by American companies in Western Europe 
exceeds total US exports, and in that a technical Lead in any field obtained 
anywhere in the West is taken up by all industry in the West, 
C. whereas there has been growing concern in the USA since the mid-seventies 
that the availability of western technology to the Soviet Union will increase 
the defence capacity of the Soviet Union, 
D. whereas the USA is to an increasing extent keepin~ technology secret and 
imposing export controls ~nd contractual restrictions on the disclosure of 
information and that, as a result, her West European allies are also 
experiencing difficulties or delay in obtaining American technology to their 
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commercial detriment in addition to the detriment they suffer from inter-
ference with their exports from and imports to the USA, 
E. whereas American legislation on export controls is broader in scope than 
similar legislation elsewhere and includes provisions on re-export from 
other countries, 
F. whereas a growing number of forms of technology are suitable both for civil 
and military applications, 
G. whereas, since the mid-seventies, the civil applications of new technologies 
have increasingly outstripped the military applications, that, accordingly, 
control over military technology can be ensured only by extending control 
over civil technologies and that this is a development that is in the process 
of being completed in the USA, among other things, in respect of the tech-
nologies included on the METAL list, 
H. whereas US Government policy is officially justified as aimed solely at 
preventing militarily critical technology from becoming available to the 
Eastern bloc and~ all technology with military applications, 
I. whereas in practice, however, the USA is indeed endeavouring to prevent the 
Eastern bloc from acquiring any technology with military applications, 
J. whereas the USA benefits primarily from the sale of cereals to the Eastern 
bloc, the economic significance of Eurpean exports to the Eastern bloc is 
primarily industrial, and they are achieved as a result of competition among 
industrialised states, 
K. whereas the European NATO allies have, in the context of COCOM, agreed under 
American pressure to a significant extension of the lists of goods and know-
how which may not be exported to the Eastern bloc and that these al.lies have 
undertaken to honour these embargo agreements, 
L. whereas, over and above these multilateral embargo agreements, the USA 
operates additional embargo lists on a unilateral basis and that Western 
Europe is thereby, in practice, also affected by a US embargo, particularly 
in respect of technological products which it is prepared, unlike the USA, 
to supply to the Eastern bloc, 
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; 
. -
M. whereas under American domestic Law the Legal definition of exports is such 
that exports from the EEC are also subject to American Legislation where 
they incorporate American components or technology resulting unjustifiably 
in a claim to extra-territoriality of American legislation, 
N. whereas this has drastic consequences for American multinationals in Western 
Europe which virtually without exception manufacture high-technology products 
and that these products are not eligible for expor.t to the Eastern bloc, 
o. whereas, as a result of the extraterritorial operation of US export Legis-
Lation, European multinationals,for which the USA is important either as a 
supplier of know-how or components or as an outlet for their products, avoid 
the Eastern European market where this clearly jeopardises both their supplies 
from America, and even more important, juridically, their proper freedom of · 
sales there, 
P. whereas, according to a recent CIA estimate, 70% of the militarily useful 
technology acquired by the Soviet Union is acquired contrary to the above-
mentioned US Laws and that it has not been able to stop the transfer of new 
technology generally agreed to be deleterious to western defence, 
Q. whereas the foregoing factors have Led rightly or wrongly to a common view in 
Europe that US provisions which exceed those agreed by COCOM are in part 
motivated by general national commerEial considerations emanating from 
political rather than business circles, 
1. Notes that the imposition of unilateral controls by the USA on the transfer 
of technology over and above the multilaterally agreed COCOM monitoring 
arrangements can only be assumed to be intended to restrict Western Europe's 
access to American technology on normal commercial terms and is contrary to 
good neighbourly national policy among allies; 
2. Notes that the economy of Western Europe suffers more damage from the statutory 
and contractual imposition of secrecy and from US Legislation on export controls 
than does the military strength of the Eastern bloc, which is able to obtain 
the technology it wants by methods which contravene US law; western under-
takings are, however, dependent on ways of acquiring technology in accordance 
with US law; 
3. Notes that, while it is true that the USA is most concerned about the consequences 
of Western technology unintentionally being made available to the Eastern bloc, it 
is predominantly Western Europe that has to bear the burden of the restrictive 
policy resulting from such concern; 
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4. Is of the opinion that the controls on the transfer of technology between COCO~I 
members themselves and between COCOM members and third countries that undertake 
to respect the COCOM rules should be dismantled as swiftly as possible and 
that the efforts undertaken in COCOM should be aimed at ensuring proper obser-
vance of the controls agreed on under national legislation; 
5. Takes the view that controls on the transfer of technology to the Eastern bloc 
be based solely on agreed technical criteria between the allies as to what is 
militarily critical technology; it is unilateral and especially indiscriminate 
proliferation of controls to alleged but not necessarily proven militarily use-
ful technologies that has undermined their effectiveness and confidence in the 
system and has thus damaged Western unity and the West European economy; 
6. Is of the opinion that nationals of, and Legal persons in, Community Member 
States cannot be subject to foreign (non-EEC) legislation; 
7. Recommends the governments of the Member States therefore to prepare after 
mutual consultations legislation to counteract this practice on the lines of 
the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980; 
8. Takes the view that the best insurance against unilateral restrictions on the 
transfer of technology from the USA is a Western Europe that also has a great 
deal to offer the USA in terms of technology; an initial requirement here is 
a major joint research and development effort by the European Community; 
9. Reiterates the need for greater cooperation in the framework of Community 
research and industrial policy with a view to improving European standards in 
the field of advanced technology, especially data processing, automation, bio-
technology, air and space travel, new materials and telecommunications; 
10. Requests the Council and Commission to bring their influence to bear on the 
USA with a view to achieving an unrestricted transfer of technology between 
the USA and the Community; 
11. Requests the Commission to forward to Parliament and Council a proposal for the 
principles governing technology transfer to and from undertakings in the Euro-
p~an Community; 
12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, Council 
and parliaments of the Member States. 
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B. 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNRESTRICTED TECHNOLOGY 
1. Scientific and industrial progress is based on the free exchange of 
concepts, know-how and information: the speed and efficiency of exchanges 
Largely determines the pace of such progress, another important factor being 
the form which exchanges take. 
2. Two major handicaps inhibit scientific exchanges within the European 
Community: firstly, the many Languages in which scientific concepts, know-how 
and information are expressed, since ideas propagate more slowly than in 
monolingual countries, such as the United States and Japan; secondly, the 
relat1vely weak links between fundamental science and industry with regard to 
applications, as a result of which, in Europe, the route from initial 
discovery to commercial application is excess1vely long. 
3. Technological development within the Community can be stimulated through 
specific action to tackle the abovementioned handicaps. 
By means of a coordinated policy on translation and on scientific exchange, 
the Community can attempt to speed up the dissemination of concepts, know~how 
and information. 
Shortening the route from initial discovery to commerical application is 
chiefly a matter for the Member States. 
However, the Commission can play a crucial, stimulative role in this 
connection, e.g. through the ESPRIT programme, which is setting a precedent 
for the transfer of know-how, concepts and information, both between the 
Member States and between the scientific community and industry. 
4. Scientific and industrial developments in Europe do not take place in 
isolation, however: there is considerable dovetailing with the United States 
in particular. Such interlocking occurs not only in science, which could 
almost be described as an homogeneous community, but in industry too. 
Not only are many leading scientists in the US of European origin, but, in a 
number of important US university faculties<1>, a majority of the postdoctnra: 
students, who are responsible for the most significant research work in higher 
education, are also foreign <and, of these, most are European). This is 
indicative of US-European Links in science. 
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The fact that US industrial undertakings in Europe produce more than the total 
US export is indicative of the economic bonds<2>. 
The unfettered exchange of scientific knowledge and technology between the US 
and Europe has boostea the pace of technological and industrial development on 
both continents. 
In recent years, however, problems have gathered on the horizon. 
CONCERN AT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS FROM WEST TO EAST 
5. In recent years, there has been much greater concern at technology 
transfers to the Communist-bloc countries, particularly in the United States. 
Four trends have been perceived which prompt this concern(3): 
a. The US lead in a number of important areas of military technology is 
thought to be waning, despite the fact that the US has relied heavily on 
military superiority for its security. It is considered that the USSR's 
relative advances would be impossible without Western technology. 
b. The difference between military and scientific research is thought to be 
rapidly narrowing, with the result that scientists working to enhance the 
state of the art may find themselves more closely involved with military 
applications than is their intention. Moreover, some universities are, of 
necessity, more concerned with applied research. 
c. More and more new technologies lend themselves to both military and 
non-military applications (dual use>. Commercial interests fund research 
in micro-electronics, industrial robotics, and cryptography (for 
computer-file protection> for exclusively non-military purposes. 
As a result, the US Administration has lost its monopoly over new areas of 
knowledge; and the traditional control instruments (official 
classification, and special conditions written into research contracts) 
are no longer adequate. 
d. As a result of d~tente in the seventies, there was a vast expansion in 
trading relations with Communist-bloc countries, and this extended to 
technology agreements. 
Increased concern brought about changes: not only hardware and technical 
information with obvious national-security implications were subject to 
controls; this was also extended to technology transfers, which include 
scientific communications and visits by foreign scientists. 
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6. In fact, the specific arrangements implemented by the United States in 
order to restrict technology transfers to the Communist bloc are less than 10 
years old(4). 
For 20 years after World war II, the US restricted East-West~ in order to 
force the USSR to utilize resources in its civilian economy which could 
otherwise have been devoted to weapons programmes. To this end, the Export 
Control Act was promulgated in 1949, on the basis of which a fairly exhaustive 
list of restricted commodities of both military and economic significanr.e wa~ 
drawn up. 
This Act was amended in 1962 in order to extend the scope of controls over 
economically significant commodities: export licences in respect of 
commodities considered to represent a significant addition to the military or 
economic potential of a hostile country were automatically withheld. 
The thaw in the Cold war set in at the end of the sixties; this was also 
reflected in a revision of US export-control legislation. Under the 1969 
Export Administration Act, the control regulations were reviewed and the list 
of restricted commodities was shortened by deleting products of purely 
economic significance or of marginal military importance. As a result, trade 
between the US and the USSR, which had traditionally lagged behind Europe's 
trade with the East, flourished. However, attainment of strategic parity bv 
the USSR in the mid-seventies gave serious cause for concern in defence 
circles. 
According to the US Department of Defence, one of the prime reasons for USSR 
attainment of parity was that Western technology had become too readily 
available. Technological superiority was- and still is- the basis for the 
military strength of the West, and of the United States in particular, 
vis-a-vis the Communist bloc; in terms of leadtime, it was waning, though 
still considerable. 
7. As part of a further review of the Export Administration Act, it was 
decided in 1979 to concentrate controls on technology itself rather than on 
products derived from technology, with a view to restricting the availability 
of us technology in particular. The technologies concerned were entered on a 
Militarily Critical Technology List (MCtL><S>. This comprises: 
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a. arrays of design and manufacturing know-how, 
b. keystone manufacturing, inspection and test equipment, and 
c. products accompanied by sophisticated operating, application and 
maintenance know-how 
which are not already available to countries subject to export-control 
arrangements and which, if exported, would permit a significant enhancement of 
military facilities operated by such countries. 
8. Though not yet incorporated into the US Department of Commerce's 
Commodities Control List <CCL), on the basis of which the Export 
Administration Act is implemented, the MCTL does play a major role as a source 
and reference document(6) during reviews of the CCL, the Munitions List and 
the CoCom lists. (See below.) 
The influence of the Bucy report <'An Analysis of Export control of US 
Technology -A DoD Perspective'> on changes in US policy on technology 
transfers has been crucial, and its conclusions have been incorporated into 
the 1979 Export Administration Act. In this report, a fundamental distinct1on 
is made between militarily critical and militarily applicable technology- a 
distinction disregarded by the Pentagon when drawing up the MCTL. 
As a result, the MCTL has expanded into a 700-page opus, and even includes the 
materials required to implement the technologies concerned. 
The Bucy report reaches the conclusion<?> that access to a technology which 
may result in evolutionary, or slow, advances need not be restricted, but that 
every effort should be made to maintain the United States' strategic leadtime 
through an export ban if a certain country would enjoy revolutionary, or very 
rapid, advances as a result of the availability of a particular technology. 
The reasoning behind this is that technological leadtime is extraordinarily 
brief: it quickly evaporates once there is greater awareness of fundamental 
concepts and know-how and they are applied on a larger scale; a country that 
has fallen behind can itself narrow the gap without recourse to formally 
agreed transfer arrangements, because it can benefit from the general sprtad 
of technology in addition to its own efforts<8>. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WITH! N THE WEST: CONTROLS AND RESTRICTIONS 
9. The US Export Administration Act defines technology as the information and 
know-how that can be applied to design, produce, utilize or reconstruct goods, 
including software and technical data, but not the goods as such(9). 
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To judge from the references to military-critical technologies in the Export 
Administration Act, however, this definition does indeed cover commodities 
too, i.e. 'keystone manufacturing, inspection and test equipment' and '~~ods 
accompanied by sophisticated operating, applications, or maintenance 
know-how' (10). 
In addition to the abovementioned proaucts, the Military Critical Technologies 
List, called for in the 1979 Export Administration Act, also includes 
'keystone equipment necessary for the effective application of a sig~ificant 
array of technical information and know-how'<11>. 
The MCTL, though lacking statutory status, is of fundamental importance as a 
source work and reference framework for all US export-control 
instruments(12>. Thus we shall use the definition of technology contained in 
the MCTL, though this does not imply endorsement thereof. 
Technology is therefore taken to mean both commodities and technical know-hc.w. 
10. The US restricts technology transfers at three levels. Classification is 
the most wide-ranging method(13>; this applies to 'scientific, technological 
or economic matters relating to the national security' and to 'cryptography'. 
Only information 'owned by, produced by or for, or is under control of the 
United States' government may be classified. In 1982, government policy on 
classification was drastically tightened up<14). Restrictions must now be 
imposed in all cases, even where the need for classification can reasonably be 
doubted. In addition, the government has expanded the number of categories of 
potentially classifiable information; hitherto freely accessible information 
may now be classified. 
The table below <1979 to 1983 inclusive> illustrates the scope of 
restrictions, as indicated in reports for the Department of Defence: 
Source Total Classified(%) Restricted(%) Unrestricted(:'() 
Defence laboratories 61,694 12 44 44 
Universities 23,119 1* 4 95 
Industry 32,806 21 35 44 
Non-profit-making 5,609 17 15 68 
organizations 
TOTAL 123,228 13 33 54 
*Research institutes linked to universities 
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Under the 1951 Invention Secrecy ActC15), patent applications by private 
individuals can be classified too, however, as has occurred more and more 
frequently in recent years. 
11. Export-related legislationC16) forms the second level at which technology 
transfer is restricted: the 1976 Arms Export-Control Act and the 1979 Export 
Administration Act. 
The export of defence-related articles and services is controlled via the Arms 
Export-Control Act and the related regulations, the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR). The US Munitions List specifies what commodities are 
controlled; this mainly catalogues military commodities, but also refers to 
technical aata related to the 'design, production, manufacture, repair, 
overhaul, processing, engineering, development, operation, maintenance or 
reconstruction of implements of war on this list' and •any technology that 
advances the state of the art or establishes a new art in any area of 
significant military applicability'(17>. 
Under this Act, the definition of exports is so broad as to include the 
disclosure of information by US citizens on visits abroad, as well as the 
disclosure of information to foreign visitors to the US. Prior export 
authorization is required in respect of all commodities and technical 
information on the Munitions List and in respect of all recipients<18). As 
far as most scientific communication is concerned, the only significant 
exception is information that has already been published and is freely 
accessible. 
12. The 1979 Export Administration Act and the relevant regulations govern 
control arrangements in respect of goods and scientific information in the 
light af national security, foreign ~olicy, and scarcity(19). The severity of 
P•port controls is dependent on the type of commodity - the characteristics ~f 
commod1ties for special consideration are given in the Commodity Control __ ~]_~_! 
(CCL) - the country of destination and the end 
use. 
An export licence is required for all goods and commodities to be exported, 
and this applies equally to technical data. 
Most exports are covered by a general licence, which is comparable to an 
exemption from compulsory application; other goods (and technical information) 
are covered by a validated licence, which must be formally applied for. The 
Department of Commerce, which implements the Export Administration Act, 
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receives dpproximately 140,000 export-licence applications every year<20>, 
90 percent of which are related to trade with non-Communist countries; and 
almost alL are approved. Routine transactions are processed in about five 
weeks; others may take six months or Longer. Trade with non-Communist 
countries under validated licences is worth approximately US$ 30,000 m per 
year. The Commodity Control List specifies, in respect of more than 100,000 
items, which countries may not receive exports without a validated Licence. 
13. The Export Administration Act is also extraterritorial in effect, sine~ 
it specifically prohibits the unauthorised re-export, diversion and transiting 
of commoditi~s or technical data. As long as goods or technical data of US 
origin are affected, it is illegal for any US or foreign citizen to export to 
a non-US-approved destination. ln addition, the re-export ban also extends to: 
1. products manufactured outside the US on the basis of technical data 
originating in the US; 
2. products manufactured under licence from a US undertaking; 
' 3. assembled or manufactured products containing one or more components of 
US origin<21>. 
Because of the system of export licences, application of the re-export clause 
is unavoidable. A US exporter issued with a general export licence must 
present a sworn Shipper's Export Declaration at the US customs office 
processing the shipment. This statement must not only specify the type and 
quantity of the commodities, but also contain the names and addresses of all 
parties involved in the transaction and indicate the final destination and the 
end consignee. In the case of validated licences, the end use of the product 
(or of the technical data) must be specified in addition to the country of 
final destination and the end consignee. Usually, therefore, not only the 
shipper's own declaration, but also the end-use declaration by the end 
purchaser or consignee must be presented<22>. In general, consequently, 
~xports from one country to another of commodities containing a component of 
US origin require prior authorization in writing from the relevant US 
authorities. 
14. Export controls in respect of technical data are analogous to those 
pertaining to commodities<23>. For exports of unpublished technical nata ~~~ 
Communist-bloc countries, a validated Licence is always required. In respect 
of freely available technical data, a GTDA licence is issued (GTDA = General, 
Technical Data Available All Destinations>, while a GTDR licence <GTDR = 
General, Technical Data Under Restriction) is required for exports of 
information on most aspects of non-military, industrial process technology~ 
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Information in the latter category may: only be exported to non-Communist 
countries. In certain cases, a shipper will be asked to provide a written 
undertaking by the importer or the end user that the data will not be 
re-exported to destinations in the Communist bloc(24). The definition of 
'release of technical data' under the Export Administration Act is very broad, 
and covers: 
1. visual inspection by foreign nationals of US equipment and facilities; 
2. oral exchange of information in the US or abroad; 
3. application to situations abroad of personal knowledge or tee l.r1ical 
experience required in the US<25). 
15. Curbs on the publication of research findings, written into research 
contracts(26>, form the third level at which technology transfer is 
restricted. Although, formally, research institutes enter into voluntary 
agreements - there is no obligation to accept the conditions - they are unable 
to put up much resistance in practice: 75 percent of their resources are 
derived from Federal Government contracts, chiefly from the Pentagon. It is 
significant that this concerns non-classified research. In January 1985, the 
Department of Defence was further empowered to withhold publication of about 
20 percent of the findings from the non-classified technological research 
commissioned by itC27). 
IMPLICATIONS OF US CONTROLS FOR EUROPEAN INDUSTRY 
16. US restrictive regulations affect European industry in three respects: 
through the extraterritorial nature of US export-related legislation, 
difficulties in obtaining US Government R & D contracts, and more restricled 
Jrcess by non-US citizens to US scientific communications. The extra-
territoriality of US legislation is the most significant problem. 
One of the consequences of the extraterritoriality of US export-related 
legislation is that, according to US law, European undertakings must check on 
the status of intended transactions before they can act<28>. A second 
consequence is that European undertakings must inquire whether the oth~r 
parties involved in a transaction have complied with relevant US legislation 
and whether, for example, US-blacklisted undertakings or persons are 
involved. 
These serious handicaps increase the burden on all but the very large 
undertakings. Generally, large undertakings will attempt to obtain th~ 
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requisite licences via their components or technology suppliers in the us, 
since they will have a better idea of how to approach the relevant US 
authorities, and will also be in a better position to obtain end-user 
declarations, estimate their worth and ensure that such declarations are 
forwarded. This also accounts for the fact that the Department of Commerce 
considers them to be more trustworthy trading partners than small 
undertakings. 
In terms of sales and component supplies, the US market is important to many 
large enterprises; consequently, not to sell to the Communist bloc is a 
deliberate policy in the global strategy of many such undertakings. According 
to a spokesman for the Dutch concern Philips(29), they intentionally refrain 
from supplying the Communist bloc with sensitive products and gear themselves 
to perfectly harmless sectors. According to this spokesman, a major reason 
for Philips' attitude is its desire to avoid all difficulties with the US, 
where 28 percent of its turnover is generated. 
Since the US domestic market for high-technology products is much Larger than 
Europe's, exports are much more important for European undertakings in order 
to recover R & D expenditure in a fast-changing sales environment. Actions 
that hamper export sales may have very grave implications for small 
undertakings. 
17. For historical and geographical reasons, moreover, Europe's trade with 
the East is much greater than the Unite.d States'; the composition is also 
different. In 1984, Western Europe's exports to Eastern Europe - industrial 
goods in the main - were worth US$ 28,200 m(30). Of total West German 
exports, 25 percent of metalworking machinery, 40 percent of mining equipment, 
10 percent of textile machinery and 20 percent of shoemaking and leather-
working machinery went to the Communist bloc, thus illustrating the 
s1gnificance of Eastern Europe for certain branches of industry. 
In 1984, us exports to the communist bloc amounted to only US$ 5,000 m, 
however, and mainly concerned grain supplies. Thus, US restrictions on the 
(re-) export of commodities to the Communist bloc have much more serious 
implications for West European exports than for those of the United States 
itself. 
It is therefore of much greater concern to western Europe than to the US that 
US controls and restrictions on exports to the East should not be excessive. 
Such contrasting interests find an outlet in the Coordination Committee 
(CoCom>, in which the US, its NATO allies <except for Spain and Iceland) and 
Japan lay down a joint policy on exports to the Communist bloc. 
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This intergovernmental forum, which was set up in 1949, long led a fairly 
restful existence, though, under US pressure, its activities have increased 
dramatically in recent years. 
Not only has there been a substantial enlargement of the lists of jointly 
controlled commodities - according to press reports, hundreds of applications 
for export licences have been rejected that would have been granted in former 
years - but export-monitoring arrangements have been tightened up considerably 
too01>. 
According to an official US source, a significant proportion of the essential 
equipment and materials included in the Department of Defence's Military 
Critical Technologies List (MCTL) was incorporated by CoCom into its lists as 
part of its latest review. This same source indicates that the know-how 
clusters contained in the MCTL are currently being sifted to serve as the 
basis for US technological-control proposals at future CoCom negotiations. 
18. Although the reaction of the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, 
after the most recent review, was that sufficient progress had again been 
made, it was recently agreed that the review of the CoCom lists would no 
longer take place every three years but that one out of every three CoCom 
lists would be reviewed every year(32>. 
With regard to the European position, the statement by the Dutch State 
Secretary for Trade that the Dutch Government 'frequently lacks the technical 
knowledge to assess the precise significance to technology exports of CoCom's 
proposed embargoes'(33> is alarming. 
Equally alarming for Europe is the fact that, despite the CoCom agreements, 
the US sees no reason to tift the unilateral restrictions on exports to~ 
states. On the contrary, it has even been stated that CoCom states should 
also be subject to controls and restrictions because US control lists are more 
comprehensive than CoCom's<34>. The rules for implementing the CoCom 
agreement of June 1984 entered into force in the US on 31 December 1984. In 
the US, the broadly based Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer (ICOTT>, 
which comprises virtually all employers' associations in the high-tech sector, 
opposes these rules. It is feared that application of these rules will cause 
a dramatic increase in the number of applications for licences by privat~ 
individuals(35). 
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19. A major handicap for foreign undertakings wishing to obtain R & D 
contracts from the most important commissioning authority in this field, the 
Pentagon, is the classified nature of many of the projects involved(36). 
Subsidiaries of foreign undertakings are only considered for such contracts if 
they are effectively 'insulated' against foreign influence. 'Insulation' must 
mean that foreign shareholders are excluded from day-t•)-day management and are 
t~us den1ed access to classified technical data. 
lr1 practice, virtually all R & D contracts are awarded to US undertakings. 
Gigdntic sums are involved: almost US$ 22,000 m in 1984. 
ln th1s respect, the Pentagon would appear to play the same role vis-~-vis 
industry as the trade and industry ministry (MITI) in Japan. The Pentagon's 
R & D budget for 1985 already amounts to US$ 35,000 m, or 65 percent of total 
research-related expenditure by the Federal Government(37>. In the United 
Stdtes~ a much larger proportion of total R & D expenditure is borne by the 
government than in other major industrialized countries (55 percent in 1979). 
The role of the Pentagon vis-a-vis US industry:<38>: 
(~) lt helps to dev@lop new products before a market for them emerges, 
(b) By defining its own standards, it makes a crucial contribution towards 
standardization of equipment, tools and instruments, 
(c) It enables manufacturers to cooperate on a reliable basis, thus helping 
them to circumvent anti-trust legislation, 
(d) Through its own procurement policy, it ensures proper coordination and 
distribution of responsibilities among manufacturers. By obtaining a 
major contract, an undertaking will be able to acquire so much expertise 
in the field concerned that it will be practically impossible for it to 
lose its Lead over other enterpr1ses. In very many fields, therefore, 
the Pentagon determ~nes which undertakings develop and thrive in which 
areas. This distribution of responsibilities at an early stage hetps to 
prevent undertakings from devoting an excessive Level of their resources 
to Juplicated projects and thus from wasting their efforts. 
(e) It bears the development risk in respect of research projects where the 
chances of a successful outcome are so slim that such a risk could not be 
borne by undertakings. 
(f) It offers a safe market and, moreover, guaranteed profits in respect of a 
substantial proportion of total production, thus permitting undertakings 
to be more competitive in the civilian marketplace too. Between 1982 and 
1987 inclusive, the Pentagon will have spent US$ 1,500 m on armaments, 
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with an ever greater emphasis on high-technotogy products; procurement 
w1Ll mainly be handLed on a 'cost plus¥ basis, i.e. production costs plus 
an agreed profit margin. 
(g) It protects US manufacturers against fier:.e foreign competition. If 
nece~sary, the P~ntagon calls for protectionist measures to prevent 
dependence on foreign suppliers i~ respect of products with significant 
defence-related applications. Recent instances of this have involved 
64-K RAM chips and a civilian glass-fibre project, the suppliers 
concerned having been Japanese in both cases. 
20. The only body in Europe that would be able to play a role comparable to 
that of the Pentago~ in the US and MITI in Japan is the Co~missi~~· 
Although the Commission, as a civilian body, is less able to command major 
funding th.'ln the Pentagon, it is more able to implement an industrial policy: 
to c~nauct military R & D and a military procurement policy is a roundabout 
method of implementing an 1ndustrial policy; moreover, there has been a change 
in thP relationship between civilian and military technological development 
s1nce the mid-seventies(39). At the start of the seventiPs, projects were 
d~velop~d specifically for military applications before being seized upon by 
the com~erc1al market. In the mid-seven~ies, the commercial sector took the 
lead in introducing new products, which the military would seize upon shortly 
afterward~. In the eighties, this trend has become much more pronounced, 
thuygh there is clearly a limit to the rate at which new products can be 
Launchea by tne commercial market. According to Lionel Olmer, US Assistant 
Secretary for International Trade, the defence sector requires six to seven 
years to incorporate a new technology such as very-high-speed semiconductor 
IC's into new weapons systems in the field, while the time lag for 
1ncorporat1ng a new semiconductor technology into a commercial product is 
~~tWPAn 'IX ~onths and tw0 years only{40). 
Accor,1ing to Oatd General spokesman Brad Stoup, today's commercial technology 
is five to ten years ahead of military capabilities(41). 
Increasing pressure from the Pentagon with a view to controlling commercial 
technoLogies is motivated not only by the military-applications potential, but 
also by the commercial sector's technological lead over the military. As a 
result of tnis trend alone, access to commercial technologies originating in 
the US will become more ana more restricted. For this reason, and because 
such technologies represent the leading edge of knowledge, a beneficial and 
necessary industrial strategy for Western Europe ~ill consist in concentrating 
on the enhancement of such technologies. 
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country. The assessments are microsurveys. 
One of the implications of this database, once it has been completed, will be 
that the US will have a detailed technological overview of Europe, though such 
a complete survey will not be available to Europe itself. 
23. The creation of a Military Significant Emerging Technologies Awareness 
List (METAL) has been the second development(44). The term 'emerging 
technology' is used to describe significant advances from one stage to the 
n~xt in technological development. In science, this refers to the process by 
which a technology, if demonstrably feasible in principle, progresses from the 
research stage to the development stage, in which it will be applied to solve 
a practical problem. The METAL List contains seven to ten technologies which 
are currently emerging from the scientific stage and might be applicable to 
m1l1tary systems. The Pentagon is monitoring the progress of these 
technologies closely, with a view both to gearing its own R & D to them (if 
they prove to be militarily attractive) and to including them on the MCTL as 
soon as they emerge from the development stage. 
As a result of emerging technologies in the US being placed under the 
supervision of the Pentagon, access to them by the commercial sector will be 
ditticult and, at best~ delayed. Indications to this effect have already been 
received from chip manufacturers collaborating with the Pentagon in the 
development of very-high-speed semiconductor IC's<4S>. 
CUktiS (IN SCI cNTHI C COMMUNI CAT! ONS 
·>. -~-l~!::::t:.~:)cJ!. ic:; to be found not only in products, but also in scientific 
:· .,.l.lc.,t wns (and, in the form of knowledge, even in the heads of scientists 
~~·~ :__:::::~~_~~). Therefore, US controls and curbs on technology exports 
{~~p~r~ Aam1nistration Act and Arms Export-Control Act) extend to technical 
da~a ccntolned not only in all manner of publications but also in oral 
cl!:municat'ions, whether abroad or to foreign visitors in the US. 
~ci~nt1sts in the US point out that this total preoccupation with national 
~'~ur·ty may yet backfire(46): unhampered communications between scientists 
~~ a~ 0s~~ntial factor in scientific progress; curbs hamper scientists' 
·- · •• 1 r ct L 1 nvest igat ions; errors go undetected longer. 
~- j, :.- 1~t:rm:~rc·..- science is a cumulative activity: all scientists build on the 
·.-~ ~·' ott:ers. Thus, freedom of information is the basis for further 
~:-:iE>r.tific progress and prevents needless duplication(47>. 
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To aspire to security by curbing exchanges of ideas and information leads only 
to ~ reduction in the pace and effectiveness of research efforts and to delays 
in progressing from research to implementation(48). 
Moreover, the research community is international: in recent years, no more 
than 37 percent of the articles in the more .than 2000 separate scientific 
p~riodicals were written by US citizens; only 21 percent of the chemistry 
articles and 30 percent of the physics articles had US authors. In addition, 
dependence on foreign research findings has increased in recent 
years(49). 
Scientific conferences and symposia also play an important role in 
communications, permitting scientists to exchange their findings more quickly 
tr,an through pubLications and to obtain immediate reactions and ideas from 
their colleagues. The informal exchange of ideas, whic.h is characteristic of 
such conferences, may lead to significant changes in research, cooperation 
efforts and to the avoidance of duplication. Because such meetings frequently 
attract the leading researchers in a given field, and are productive for all 
concerned, they often draw an international audienceCSO>. 
Scientists and their students hold the $ame type of informal discussions at 
university: it is not without reason that the percentage of foreign doctoral 
1 
students in the US rose considerably in the seventies <25-40 percent in a 
number of crucial natural and engineering sciences>, while the percentage of 
foreign students among postdoctoral researchers rose to as much as 50 to 60 
percent in the same disciplinesC51). 
25. The US conducts a policy which, to an ever greater extent, prevents the 
publ1cat1on of scientific articles, causes papers to be withdrawn from 
symposia or makes it impossible for scientists to attend such meetings, and 
refuses foreign students admission to university courses. In doing so, the US 
is not only undermining the basis of 1ts own progress, however, which it owes 
to scientific achievements rather than to secrecy; rather, it is also souring 
considerably the good relations enjoyed with friendly nations in 
turope. 
The d1squieting aspect of this entire development is the fact that it is 
articles and conferences dealing with unclassified information that are being 
interfered with and that this is taking place not on the basis of a security 
inquiry, but in the light of individuals' nationalities(S2>. 
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26. It is the responsibility of the European Community's institutions and of 
the Member States to point out to the US 
that it is unacceptable for the US to declare its legislation enforceable 
on the territory of its allies. If measures need to be taken by its 
allies in the light of security or foreign-policy considerations, 
consultations constitute the means to achieve the objectives concerned. 
In the security field, the appropriate forum for consultations is CoCom. 
However, it is in no way appropriate for the US first to obtain major 
concessions from its allies in such consultations and then, however, to 
apply additional, bilateral controls that also affect these allies. 
Agreed multilateral controls imply the abolition of unilateral controls. 
that the pace of scientific progress is dependent on the proper 
organization and unhampered exchange of scientific information. Barriers 
in this area not only impede scientific progress; they also compel Europe 
to conduct its own research, overlapping and wasted effort being an 
unavoidable outcome. Mutual rivalry, unlike cooperation, benefits 
neither Europe nor the United States. If the US does not adopt a 
cooperative attitude on technology transfers to Western Europe, Europe 
will have no alternative but to compete. 
The further review of the Export Administration Act, with a view to amendment 
presents, a timely opportunity to assess US intentions. A follow-up to this 
report may then be desirable. 
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